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CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: A PANEL DISCUSSION
Professor Margaret A. Berger·
Good Morning. My name is Margaret Berger. Welcome to
this morning's discussion on the future of the federal courts in
federal litigation-a look to the twenty-first century. We're
very fortunate, indeed, to have with us today three preeminent
members of the legal community who are highly qualified to
comment on these issues. Not only has each of our panelists
been an articulate, thoughtful observer of federal practice, but
each has been an important player in the process itself.
Collectively, they have been viewing the litigation process in
the federal courts from some of the most illuminating vantage
points.
The Honorable Ralph K Winter has been a United States
Circuit Judge in the Second Circuit since 1982. As such he has
sat on panels dealing with some of our most troublesome cases,
such as Agent Orange and asbestos litigations. Prior to his
appointment ,he was a full-time professor at the Yale Law
School. He also has another vantage point, because he was a
member of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from 1987-1992, and is now
chairman of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence.
Kenneth R. Feinberg has recently founded the
Washington, D.C. law firm of Kenneth R. Feinberg &
Associates and was formerly a lead partner in a major Wall
Street firm. Mr. Feinberg, you all know, has frequently served
as a special master in some of the most complex litigation
around, including the Agent Orange case, the asbestos
litigation, and DES litigation. He has also found time to be an
academic as an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown.
Judith Resnik is the Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law at
• Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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the University of Southern California. She is a prolific writer
in the field of procedure, and has been involved in issues
dealing with complex litigation in such capacities as consultant
to the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos at the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and as consultant to RAND's
Institute for Civil Justice. She has even at times appeared as
an appellate litigator in complex cases. She also is the co-
author (with Robert Cover and Owen Fiss) of a casebook,
Procedure. I have asked her to begin with a brief summary of
the themes that have been raised.
Professor Judith Resnik
We have been asked to look forward-to procedure in the
twenty-first century. But I think we need to look back first to
understand a little bit about where we have been in the last
few decades before we can discuss even where we are, let alone
where we are going. Much of the commentary over the last day
and a half has posited a procedural world that, at least from
the vantage point of those who taught civil procedure,
appeared-up until very recently-to be fairly tidy. One
seemed to know who the "players" were and who made the
rules. Reading the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,1 one spoke of
judicial control of rulemaking. One described how the Supreme
Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
how the heart of the drafting occurred within the committees
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, particularly
the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules. We also thought
we could describe the rulemakers' aspirations-access,
efficiency, the focus on the merits-even as we had to
acknowledge the invisibility of much of their work. While the
1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act2 added a window
into the process of rulemaking (by making meetings open and
enabling spectators to watch procedural rulemaking,) those
amendments did not reformulate the process of rulemaking in
major respects. Finally, the 1938 rules were "trans-
substantive" (one set of rules across a wide variety of
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 et seq. (1988).
2 The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 331 et
seq. (1988).
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substantive areas) and uniform (one set of rules for the
nation).
Given the assumption of a stable and readily described
process, with relatively clear lines of command, and of one set
of rules governing all litigation, one can posit that the current
world is now quite different. In 1990, Congress enacted the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA"),3 which has, in
essence, empowered ninety-four amateur Advisory Committees,
local groups of lawyers, judges and even an occasional non-
litigant, who now have the authority to frame civil rules that
might differ, district to district. Given the contrast between the
presumably neatly delineated "old regime" and the new, one
might perceive a major shift-to a world that is now terribly,
and suddenly, messy. With that framing, it is not surprising
that, thus far at this Symposium, we have heard words like
"disintegration," "chaos," "collision courses" and ''balkan-
ization.'14 Jeff Stempel, somewhat more upbeat, describes us as
in a time of "shifting paradigms."s
My own sense is that the world was never quite so tidy as
it had been described nor is it quite so messy now. The
traditional story told is that, since the 1930s, the judiciary has
had control of rulemaking. However, that vantage point comes
from a somewhat narrow perspective, one focused on the civil
rulemaking process, rather than on rulemaking as a whole,
and further, one predicated on a limited definition of
procedural rules. If one looks at rulemaking from a perspective
that includes the civil and criminal rules, one sees that
Congress never let go of the process as much as has been
described by civil proceduralists. Major examples of
rulemaking by Congress include in 1972, congressional
intervention in and delay of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974,6 congressional revision of Rule 6 of
3 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. II 1990).
• See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call
for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 841 (1993); Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching
Civil Procedure While You Watch it Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1155 (1993);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?
Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659
(1993); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal
Civil Procedure, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992).
5 See Stempel, supra note 4, at 688.
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq. (1988).
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (addressing disclosure
of materials from the Grand Jury), and congressional
amendment of Rule 35 of the Civil Rules to authorize
psychologists, as well as psychiatrists, to conduct mental
examinations.
In other words, the proposition is overstated that, under
the pre-1990 regime governed by the Rules Enabling Act of the
1930s, Congress had sent all rulemaking to the judiciary and
left it there, undisturbed for more than fifty years. Over these
decades, Congress has kept its hand in. Further, the Executive
branch, by way of the Department of Justice, has always been
a very significant player in rule drafting. With the relatively
recent data-basing on computer fiche of the archival
memoranda exchanged in the rules process, those interested in
the history of the civil and other rules can read the memos and
notes, which I think will require us to tell a different story
than the one we have provided thus far.7 The Judicial
Conference committees were the dominant but not the
exclusive makers of procedural rules.
Furthermore, the demise of tran-substantive and uniform
rules also predates the 1990 CJRA. In 1968, after Congress
authorized multidistrict litigation,8 a special set of rules was
crafted to apply to such cases.9 In 1977, Congress created a
discrete set of rules for habeas corpus litigation.1o In 1986, the
second edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation was
published, bringing with it not binding rules but a "series of
basic principles" for "fair and efficient resolution of complex
litigation."ll In 1983, the judiciary amended Rule 16 not only
to provide for case management, but also to permit judges to
exempt categories of cases, presumptively inappropriate for
managerial judges. A research project, sponsored by the
7 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 8-16 (1991) (shedding light on the reformation in the 1960s of Rule 23
(class actions) by virtue of memoranda exchanged by members of the Advisory
Committee).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
9 See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION (1993); Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 75
F.R.D. 577 (1977) and 124 F.R.D. 479 (1989) ("Clerk of the Panel").
10 See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
11 MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 10 (2d ed. 1986).
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Judicial Conference to survey local rules in the district courts,
documented that by the late 1980s, more than 5000 local rules
existed, and that some of them were in substantial variance
with the national rules.12 Meanwhile, those watching the
Supreme Court struggle with the meaning of "due process"
learned that the concept was flexible and that the amount of
process due varied with the private interest at stake, the
government's interest, and the risk of error under one
procedural regime as contrasted with another13-in short,
holding that trans-substantive rules were neither consti-
tutionally mandated nor necessarily wise.
Once one acknowledges this history, one sees an
evolution-from the 1930s model of trans-substantivity and
uniformity to the creation of different rules for different kinds
of cases and to increasing local variations. As a consequence,
current procedural innovations seem less like a sudden
departure and more continuous with the past.
Further, the continuity runs in the other direction as well.
In papers presented in this Symposium, Lauren Robel and
Carl Tobias describe work now underway as implementation of
the Civil Justice Reform Act proceeds.14 What is interesting to
me is their description of agreement and of uniformity, rather
than of great disuniformity among the different districts. We
learn from Professors Robel and Tobias that during the early
phase of implementation, when some 30 districts had drafted
plans, many had similar or identical rules, developing
requirements for "differential case management," for disclosure
and exchange of information and for settlement conferences.
We learned further that a good many districts were not
promulgating new rules but simply codifying rules and
practices already in place within a district. In other words, the
current rules are not so widely varying as might be assumed.
The new world of procedure is not quite so different from the
old world; there is a good deal of continuity as well as change.
12 See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1999, 2020 (1989).
13 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
IC Lauren K Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 879 (1993); Carl Tobias,
Silver Linings in Federal Civil Justice Reform, 59 BROOK L. REv. 857 (1993).
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Let me turn to what we have learned about some of the
changes. Both Lauren Robel and Bryant Garth have spoken of
a grass roots movement exerting pressure to prompt changes
in the rules of litigation. I5 One question I have is about those
"roots." If the so-called "grass roots" are comprised of lawyers
who are by and large a narrow segment of the bar, who have
already been participating in the framing of rules and who
have populated committees of the bench and bar for many
years, then the metaphor of ''branches'' from the same "tree" is
more apt than that of "grass roots." A second question I have
concerns whether, with lawyers and judges and non-lawyers
thinking about procedure, we can help to stimulate a creative
conversation or whether we will see disintegration to stances
defined by narrow assumptions of self-interest. Yet a third
problem is about costs: who pays for the inevitable costs of
transition? As we do experiment, invent and generate local or
national efforts to reframe procedure, how will we protect
clients from bearing the costs of these changes? Will lawyers
bill clients for time spent learning new procedures? Will judges
be forgiving of lawyer and client failures to conform to local
variations?
A final problem is the intersection between the financing
of litigation and the rules of procedure. The 1930s rules did not
directly address this issue. In the 1990s, it is less attractive
and plausible not to consider the problems all too obviously
before us. As we see numbers of large scale cases (such as
those like Agent Orange and the breast implant litigation,
which my co-panelists have participated in as either judge or
special master), we see that certain forms of litigation offer
major economic incentives to lawyers and create opportunities
for judges to exercise stunning amounts of power. Therefore, I
believe proceduralists need to insist that rules about attorneys'
fees and attorney ethics have to be considered when procedural
rules are framed. Let me conclude here by pointing out that
this convergence of ethics, fee structures (for both plaintiff and
defense lawyers) and procedure demonstrates again the need
to describe procedure not as stable and fixed, but as fluid, and
15 See Robel, supra note 14, at 884; Bryant Garth, From Ciuil Litigation to
Priuate Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profession and its Values, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 931 (1993).




Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq.
Is there chaos, is there disruption, or is there calm or
something in between? I think it's probably somewhere in-
between. I want to give a rather parochial view. The parochial
view of not only a special settlement master who gets involved
in these mass tort cases, but a political overview of the
situation as I see it having spent a good deal of time as a
United States Senate staff member, and now practicing law in
Washington.
First I think it's very risky to paint with too broad a
brush. As I see it with parochial blinders on, the real problem
of how the federal courts will deal with mass litigation into the
twenty-first century is mass tort litigation. That's the real
problem. I don't think the complex case is any more a problem
today than it was twenty years ago. It's the mass tort
problem-the Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, breast implant,
heart valve, asbestos and DES cases. It's the mass tort cases
that drive much, maybe not all, but a good deal of the criticism
of the rigidity of the existing rules. And in my experience, one
has to be very careful about which tail is wagging which dog. I
think that the millions of dollars that have been spent by
American industry to try to modify substantive rules of tort
law in Congress avails the industry of nothing. There will not
be such tort reform. Whether there should or should not is
really beyond the subject of my topic today. But I think that
the real issue in terms of the availability of flexible civil rules
of procedure to deal with a complex case is really in essence a
discussion of how we deal with the mass tort case-not the
traditional Johnny-got-hurt-by-the-Iawn-mower case, but the
mass tort case. And when you begin to talk about modifications
of the rules to deal with the phenomenon of mass tort, you
must ask yourself what is the alternative? What are the
available alternatives if one concludes, as I have concluded for
the last five years, that there will be no appreciable legislative
interference with this process-especially now with the Clinton
Administration. There simply will not be a sweeping reform of
the mass tort procedural problem or substantive problem
coming from the halls of Congress. So in effect the courts must
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do what they can with the tools at their disposal. If one agrees
with that supposition then one can begin to focus on the real
question, which is what can the courts do without legislative
interference or administrative agency interference to deal with
the phenomenon of the mass case?
Before the courts even begin to act, I think one must deal
with the provocative conclusion-and it is provocative-that
the consumers of American justice want people compensated.
That's very important. When you look at -these cases-Agent
Orange, DES, asbestos, Dalkon shield-it is a fair reading of
the climate in America in 1980 through the end of this century
that the American people want to see the alleged victims of
these mass tort injuries compensated. Legislatures won't do it.
The courts have to. That's what the American people want. It's
a provocative point, but I think it's an important one.
So what will you see at the federal level? I think you'll see
continued efforts by the judiciary, federal and, I might add,
state, to use the flexibility and the discretion that the judges
have to try to "do justice." And to my way of thinking that
means that we must have more judges. I think arbitrary caps
on the number offederal or state judges won't fly as a practical
matter. But beyond that, I think that you will see that the
following steps will be taken to try to deal with the
phenomenon. One, as almost a sine qua non for resolving these
mass cases, there must be more and more efforts at
aggregation. If you don't have all the cases in one forum, woe
onto anybody trying to deal nationally with the phenomenon. I
mean when you have 192,000 DES cases, 250,000 Agent
Orange cases, 130,000 asbestos cases, etc., the idea of trying to
deal with that type of phenomenon in a piecemeal way, as
asbestos teaches us, is impossible. So if you have the cases and
you aggregate the cases in one forum, you can begin to come
up with some judicial response to the problem using the rules
as best you can in developing consensus law, a national rule
and jurisdiction in resolving conflicts disputes. These are
issues under the rules that bedevil the judiciary but leave the
consumer with no alternative but to look to the judiciary.
Aggregation is critical.
The second change or approach as we move to the twenty-
first century is increased efforts at developing creative
settlement techniques. As you know, it's the choir talking now,
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because that's what I do. But the fact of the matter is that
there is an increased need for the judiciary, confronting
clogged dockets, to develop more flexibility in fashioning
mediation, settlement, arbitration, mini trials, summary jury
trials and other ways to get the cases resolved. That poses a
great problem in terms of tailored individual justice, but the
fact of the matter is that it's an essential. It's an essential
building block of any solution because the courts are ill
equipped to try these cases one at a time. It can't be done.
So if you look at aggregation and settlement you see why
Judge Jack B. Weinstein has this almost ideological support
for techniques like the class action that will aggregate the
cases. There is no alternative. We've got to get rid of the cases.
How are we going to do it? One by one? We can't do it one by
one. Let's aggregate them. Let's appoint Feinberg or some
other special settlement master and let's get rid of the cases.
Now that raises a third problem which is much more
difficult problem to grasp: that in these mass cases, what do
you do once they're aggregated, and once you have a vehicle to
settle, what do you do about future claims? That is the
substantive problem. But it is a substantive problem that
bedevils efforts to settle present cases. Stu Rickerson is here
from Keene. Paul Miller is here from Pfizer. I'm sure they will
tell you that however aggregated the group may be, settling a
whole series of aggregated present claims is throwing good
money at the problem if you can't get global peace, if you can't
somehow come to grip with futwe claims that haven't yet
manifested themselves because of the latency of the disease,
but they're around the corner. You can try to predict in some of
these asbestos cases how many claims there will be over the
next thirty years. What about those cases? In Agent Orange, as
Judge Winter knows, the defendant chemical industry had
absolutely no incentive to settle an aggregated class action if
they weren't assured of total peace. We don't want a Vietnam
Veteran in 1997 coming back trying to reopen the settlement.
And that is precisely what has happened. The Ivy case in the
Second Circuit raises the issue of the ability of judges and
lawyers acting today to bind unknown future claims, and Ivy
says that future claimants can be so bound.16 And that is the
16 Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
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third big problem here in the twenty-first century in dealing
with these hosts of as yet unmanifested future injuries-latent
claims. How do you deal with that problem.
So I think that those three points are the points I want to
make here at the outset-the absence of available alternatives
leading to aggregation, settlement and global peace. And I
think that's what the rules and the flexibility of judicial
decisionmaking and discretion point to in the absence of the
legislature doing anything else.
As a final point, I agree with Professor Resnik that a
tremendous problem in this whole area is the skepticism, the
suspicion of the trial bar. They know the devil that they
confront, and it's not such a devil. They've been taught to deal
with the litigation. The idea of the adversary system has been
drummed into them in law school, and I think that the trial
bar is extremely skeptical of much of what I have suggested
will be the essence of the next ten years. I'll tell you exactly
how trial lawyers view what I do, and what Judge Weinstein
does. I am reminded of the story of Satan. Satan comes to the
trial lawyer, a fellow right here in Brooklyn, and he says to the
trial lawyer: "I'm going to make you the most famous trial
lawyer in America. You're going to make millions of dollars.
You're going to be able to retire, and put your children through
school. And they'll have a dowry forever. I'm going to make you
the head of the City Bar Association. You're going to be the
most famous, most prominent lawyer in the United States.
And all I want in return is your soul to rot in hell, damnation
and fire forever, for eternity. And I want your wife's soul and
your children's soul." The lawyer looks at the devil and says,
''What's the catch?" That's how the trial bar views the solution
I have discussed today.
Honorable Ralph K. Winter
I guess I'm kind of pessimistic about the future. In the
trial courts, I find tremendous inefficiencies, costs and delays
that seem to me to be needless. I think the likelihood of reform
is low. Speaking as a former member of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, it is my impression that lawyers
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
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like complicated rules. They like a lot of things in there. Part
of it is the individual lawyer's approach to things, which is to
think about the odd case. We have this proposal, which is
under all kinds of emotional attack from defense lawyers, and
which says that at the beginning of a case you will act as
though interrogatories that any competent lawyer would have
served upon you have been served.17 And there's been a
motion to compel that has been granted. You shall act that
way because each of those is inevitable. And the trial bar yells,
"Oh my God, we are going to have to turn over things." You
know well they inevitably would have to be turned over. I have
talked to defense lawyer after defense lawyer about this. And
the conversation goes on, "Dh yeah it's awful, it's a bad idea, I
mean really it's terrible." I hear this from close friends and
former law clerks, and finally I'll get a reason out of them.
What's bad about this? Well, the reason is that sometimes you
get an incompetent lawyer who wouldn't file those
interrogatories. And then we'll drop the subject and just talk
about things generally. And they'll say, "Judge, you know most
discovery is absolutely useless." But when we try to reform,
we're up against this hysteria. There are clients who are
paying a lot of money. I mean why insurance companies want
lawyers to resist things that are going to be granted so that
they pay for paper and everything else to end up where they
were going to end up anyway is really beyond me.
Now I'm influenced by my experience as a trial judge. It's
not extensive. But I am given routine cases because the
routine cases are the cases the district judges don't want. They
don't want to try another one of these particular cases because
they've been doing them. So I get FELA, police brutality,
employment cases and things like that. I can say a couple of
things in my experience about this. First, I'm told every time
the case is ready for trial that there's been almost no discovery
request that has been complied with. But the three years pass
and some judge who heard I was coming around declared it
ready for trial. I'll discover that the interrogatories haven't
been answered and that the documents haven't been turned
over. Now these are FELA cases-where everyone knows what
17 See FED. R. CN. P. 26. Because Congress failed to modify or eliminate the
proposed rule, it became effective on December I, 1993.
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the accident was, and it was reported-and an individual
police brutality case, and employment cases about discrete
events. Everybody knows what the documents are. I'll come in,
and I'll find out discovery hasn't been done and I say, "Oh,
we're going to trial in two weeks; you turn over the document
six days from now." And once in a while a trial lawyer will tell
me what the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for, I
will say, "Oh, o.k. mandamus me. Meanwhile, turn it over in
six days. And we're ready to go to trial. You mandamus me,
maybe the trial will be put off later, and you will come back,
and I'll still try the case." And my God it gets done.
I've got to say one reason that I support mandatory
disclosure (although I had opposed the earlier versions of the
reform before we rewrote it so that it was applicable only to
facts) was my experience that people could turn these things
over. I talked to a couple judges this weekend-one in the
Northern District of California-and they have that rule out
there. They had absolutely no trouble with it, no trouble with
it whatsoever. And everybody is saving money, but it may get
rejected by the Congress.
Second, lawyers don't want to change. They just don't like
change. They look at every proposal-and they're right to
because a lot of proposals have unintended consequences-but
there's never a comparison with what happens now. They
always ask ''What is it going to be in the future?," but they
never put in the balance the things that might be eliminated if
you had a simplified easier procedure.
And then there's money. I hate to bring it up, but a lot of
firms are geared to long expensive discovery. And if you try
and reform them, they resist. It's these big cases with the
firms where everybody's charging by the hour that the
discovery goes on. Those are millions if not millions and
millions of dollars of social waste.
Alright, now Ken Feinberg is right. One of the big
problems facing "the federal courts are toxic torts. Not to dump
on the substantive law of toxic torts but there is one fact that's
left out of any discussion that one hears about Agent Orange,
particularly where academics are around. In my corporation
law class, when I was talking about unlimited liability a couple
of months ago, I mentioned the opinion in the Agent Orange
case, which essentially said it's totally baseless litigation. And
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they all looked at me in surprise, but you know the
outstanding fact about Agent Orange is that there was no
evidence that it caused the harm alleged when brought and
there was no evidence that it caused the harm alleged when
settled. $180,000,000 was paid. Even the New York Times
called it "Orange Mail." When the settlement was appealed
there was still no evidence that it caused any harm. But it had
disrupted federal court business and a lot of money was paid
as settlement. Toxic torts I think are more difficult in some
ways than Ken says. The easy toxic tort, although a big
troublemaker, is asbestos because asbestos causes a harm that
is peculiar to asbestos. That is, if somebody has asbestosis, you
don't have to worry about whether they were exposed. With
Agent Orange, any ailment-sleeplessness, for example-was
up for grabs. There were only one or two ailments that were
peculiar to exposure to dioxin, if I remember the record
correctly, and they were not found in any great incidence in
Vietnam veterans. So the Agent Orange-type case is very
different. There are tremendous questions about both exposure
and causation. There are questions of whether Agent Orange
causes injury and, if so, which company is responsible.
I've always had problems with aggregating those cases
because each individual comes in with an ailment that is
abroad in the population as a whole-there's 300, 400
ailments-and each one has to connect it to exposure to Agent
Orange, which is very, very hard to do because each one may
have been exposed to dioxin elsewhere. The fact was that there
was a lot of dispute as to where Agent Orange was sprayed. It
was not sprayed everywhere in Vietnam. And everyone's
damages are different. With all of these questions I always had
a big problem with aggregation, as I said in the opinion about
a class action in this case. I said the class action could be
justified for purposes of the military contractor defense, which
did apply to all those plaintiffs. But it does seem to me that
you've got to have common facts as to liability before you
aggregate any kind of tort case. Then of course you have to
separate for damages.
Finally, another source of pessimism is the apparent shift
of state cases to federal court, through such legislation as the
Violence to Women Act and RICO, which has transferred a lot
of breach of contract cases, tons of breach of contract cases to
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the federal courts with wire fraud as a predicate act. I see no
choice but for the federal courts to expand. I do share the view
that my colleague Jon Newman has stated that to the extent
you reach a certain size as you expand, the job becomes less
desirable and I think there is empirical evidence to support
that. But my main worry about expansion is just about having
a coherent caseload.
Professor Berger
Obviously all of our panelists talked to some extent about
a difference between the large and the small case. Let's talk
for a moment about the large case, which perhaps drives the
system. I'd like to ask you whether you think that the large
case is still a classic case of adjudication as it currently exists
in the federal system, given the fact that we often have non-
Article III personnel engaged in it, such as Ken himself, and
that we are dealing with a settlement mode and a suggestion
that more and more aggregation will be needed? Is this
something that still resembles the adjudication that we have
seen in the past, and where do you see the future of this kind
of a model going in the twenty-first century? Is this something
that we should continue to have in our federal system or do we
really have a new ADR model, in which case perhaps the
courts are not the best institutions to deal with these kinds of
cases at all?
Dr. Deborah R. Hensler*
I think, obviously, that's a very hard question to answer
because there are lots of pieces to it. One of the issues has to
do with the way the cases arise. You know it's easy for Ken
and me to talk about aggregating these cases, and the
problems and incredible social costs of pretending that we're
handling the several hundred thousand claims in the system in
any individualized fashion. We're either handling them using
the kinds of mechanisms Ken talks about or we're handling
them in aggregated form, although informally-as I say,
• Senior Social Scientist and Director, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, and
Professor of Social Science in Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
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pretending that we still have an individualized system. But the
cases don't in the first instance appear full blown, you know,
out of the head of Zeus as a million cases. And so if we want to
think about new models, we do have to think about how these
cases arise, assuming we want them to arise. Certainly there
are some people who don't. Do we want a system in which
somebody can bring a claim and say I think that this product
that I used thirty years ago injured me, and by the way I don't
remember exactly who manufactured this product? Ken says
yes. It appears that the American people agree, given trial
verdicts that juries sometimes reach in these cases. We want
to compensate people. One hundred dollars, one million
dollars, nineteen million dollars, forty-two million dollars-it
sounds like a lot of compensation.
So we have the question of how we get these cases in the
beginning. What do you do with them? How much discovery do
you give them? What are the opportunities for gathering the
information? If there is a smoking gun do we want· it to be
found? Do we not want it to be found? Until we start thinking
more seriously about that inception stage, we can't really talk
about any sort of real solution.
The second problem is how do you know when you're past
the beginning? How do you know you're at the stage where you
should aggregate these cases? We now have some considerable
evidence that when you aggregate it has a big effect. It can
save lots of costs. Maybe that's what we want to focus on. But
it may also mean that some people don't get compensation. The
biggest problem in this area in the current debate is the search
for panaceas. There is no panacea. This is hard stuff. And I
think we ought to start confronting all of the hard issues,
including the issues, as Judith said, that have to do with huge
economic incentives that exist for the lawyers who are involved
in this business and who we're asking to craft solutions. They
have a tremendous conflict of interests in doing that.
Professor Berger
Well, are we beginning perhaps also to see change in the
sense that, for example, the breast implant litigation was
handled from the beginning in a way that prior mass tort cases
were not handled until years down the line, in terms of
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assigning it to a judge, in terms of the orders that are out
there. Is that a good model? Is that going to cause us more
problems?
Professor Resnik
I think we should sort out two different issues. I do not
share Ken Feinberg's theory that mass torts are the only
example of the real problem. Twenty-five years ago, many
conferences on "the courts" and the problems of procedure
focused on institutional reform cases. Much attention was paid
to the remedial problems: how to respond to segregation and to
horrific conditions at hospitals and prisons? The remedial focus
now has shifted to the mass tort, but we should not lose sight
of the many other large scale cases and the problems of
aggregate litigation in them as well. One example comes from
a recent essay by Professor Nancy Morawetz about the
difficulties of group representation in the context of social
security class actions. 18 Issues of conflict, bargaining,
allocation of resources, and lawyers' ethics are plentiful
whenever groups are involved, of whatever kind. Further, one
finds examples of aggregation in other areas; the Sentencing
Guidelines are a vehicle of aggregation, as we make grids to
, systematize decisionmaking across a category of cases.
Issue one, then, is aggregation of cases, claims, and parties
into larger amalgams and the need to respond to the
difficulties created by those amalgams.19 Issue two is about a
related but distinct problem: a declining interest in fact
finding. The rise in managerial judging and the interest in
alternative dispute resolution brings with it a declining
interest in fact finding. While not all forms of alternative
dispute resolution involve disregarding facts (indeed, some like
court-annexed arbitration are interested in facts), a popular
mode of ADR in the federal courts is judicially run settlement
conferences. Ralph Winter has commented here that no one
talks about the facts of Agent Orange. Recall that Judge
Weinstein dismissed some of the cases of those who had "opted
18 Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 Oma
ST. L,J. 1 (1993).
19 See Resnik, supra note 7.
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out" because he found they had no cause of action (no claim
based on then-available evidence that dioxin caused harm).
Therefore, the settlement that involved the defendants paying
plaintiffs $180 million seems in tension with the legal/factual
posture of the case.
If settlements are to be desired, no matter what the
"facts," then we may find ourselves in a world in which
responsibility is not relevant, and the focus is only on the
transfer of funds. Some of the proponents of ADR are going to
find out that ADR is turning around to bite them because if
one does not care about who's really responsible, then the
people who have the resources to pay in a world in which
people want payment are going to have to pay something.
Whereas, if you try to say it matters what happened-and that
caring about what ''happened'' requires some decisionmaking,
some reconstruction of "facts" and their intersection with ''law''
to produce some decision with authority-then we must figure
out a way to esteem and to constrain those with the hard job of
fact finding. I think a real motif of the last two decades has
been a move away from an interest in fact finding.
Judge Winter
I want to say something about the big case. I teach
corporate law at Yale, and I have to deal with the class action
in that context. I am really struck by the literature on the
class-action derivative suit. The literature portrays it as the
opposite of what is taught at the Yale Law School, which is
that the class action is the greatest thing since sliced bread,
and all kinds of public rights are going to be enforced, and the
population will be lifted out of poverty and ignorance, and we
will go to the sunlit uplands. What you apparently see when
you look at the cases is a lot of lawyers making money, and
that's it. The interests of the attorneys and the interests of the
class are not aligned. The attorneys want fees. The class is
something distant, something that has to be in the caption of
the complaint. I don't want to overstate this, but there are two
scholars, Roberta Romano of Yale and Janet Cooper Alexander
of Stanford who have studied class and derivative actions,
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made empirical studies, and the results are shocking.20 They
shocked me. I had always thought that the derivative action
was more or less an unqualified good. But what they found
was the vast majority of law suits are frivolous. They are
brought, and they're frivolous. Almost none ever go to trial and
judgment. Some get dismissed early and the rest are settled.
Roberta Romano found that ninety percent of the settlements
involve counsel fees. But only fifty percent of the settlements
involved any monetary return to the class. You know I guess
that's usually paid by insurance. Alexander took a set of cases
in which there were suits because the price of a share of stock
twelve months later was lower than the initial offering price.
That is, they issued the stock at $100 and twelve months later
it was trading at less than $100. She found that any time
there was a financially able defendant and the gap in the price
was large enough to afford a counsel fee, then in every such
case a lawsuit was brought. Now since without fraud some
stocks, I hate to tell you, trade at less than their offering price
twelve months later, that's some evidence that these cases are
brought without regard to the merits.
Another interesting thing about these cases is these are
cases where damages can be calculated with precision. The
stock sold initially at 100, traded twelve months later at
seventy-five, you multiply twenty-five dollars times the
number of shares that were sold so you get a precise damage
claim. It's not pain and suffering. Alexander found that the
majority of settlements fell within a three percent range of
about twenty-five percent, and that the vast majority were
between twenty-one percent and twenty-eight percent which
seems to suggest either that all the suits were frivolous or that
the settlement was without regard to the merits. It may mean
that as long as you get a certain amount of money on the table,
class counsel has an incentive to settle. The defendant has an
incentive to settle. And that's what happens. The class mayor
may not benefit. Usually the money is paid by insurance. And
corporations pay premiums. Or you have one group of investors
paying another group of investors.
20 Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991).




Well, I think that certainly a central issue that emerges
from all of this is what is going to be the future of attorneys
fees? An issue that is certainly not talked about much in law
school is what is it appropriate for attorneys to earn. I think
we all tend to think that we are sending out our students to
earn money and that's the end of any obligation to talk about
ethical or other implications.
Professor Stephen N. Subrin*
I taught the Agent Orange case five or six times to
students in two schools. And these are students who would be
prone to admire Jack Weinstein. Yet almost invariably they
agree that maybe we should actually let these things be found
like a normal case with facts and law applied. The students
say that from the Veterans' point of view, they lost; the fact is
that the peanuts that the award came out to per person didn't
really help anybody. So maybe it is a good idea to view this as
a case that has some elements, you try it, like it was done in
the Fifth Circuit-where, by the way, it came out the other
way. What do you think about that now? Are the students
right that in retrospect let the case run its course, see what
happens? .
Mr. Feinberg
I don't know whether the students are right or wrong. I
know that the judiciary and the parties in that case don't agree
with the students. I assure you that the arguments that Judge
Winter has made today about the lack of merit of the case
notwithstanding-and he does cite a very important treatise in
that regard, the New York Times Editorial page-the seven
chemical companies in the court room were unwilling to run
the risk over a two year period perhaps, especially if they had
insurance, they were unwilling to run the risk that the
students' perception that the case was without merit was
wrong.
• Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
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The students didn't say it was without merit. They wanted
to hear what happened.
Mr. Feinberg
I happen to agree with Judge Winter. I think it's hard not
to agree with Judge Winter about the causal connection at that
time up to the present day between Agent Orange and the
alleged maladies. But you know Davis Polk, Cravath, Sullivan
& Cromwell were all there representing the seven companies.
The Vietnam Veterans, represented by able plaintiff lawyers, I
assure you, were willing to cut that deal. Now Judge Weinstein
should say no? Let's try the case and see who's right? Not
realistic.
Judge Winter
I said in the opinion that I thought that the settlement in
that case was as certain as the sunrise once you had the class
certified. I mean you would reach a settlement in the early
morning, but you were going to have a settlement. But the
chemical companies resisted certification until they had some
real assurance that all the plaintiffs were in and everyone else
was going to be barred. And then what happens is as soon as
you get a critical amount of money on the table, the chemical
companies know there's going to be a settlement. Now $180
million was the largest ever paid at the time. Right? But if you
divide the number of possible plaintiffs into $180 million and
you think that a good case is worth $500,000, it was a
nuisance value settlement. But there are things to be learned'
from Agent Orange about how these things operate. And the
students may well be right. The problem with the students'
argument is the cost of the individual litigation. When you add
it all up, 90% will go to lawyers and 10% to the injured.
Unidentified Questioner
You might want to consider the role that lawyers' fees play
in significant litigation. I'm not going to use the word mass
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tort or mass litigation because mass tort is just a number of
actions, most of which probably should not be in the court. If
we were to decide as a society that we are going to deal with
injuries today and not deal with potential future or fear of
injuries tomorrow, the mass tort would not be there. We'd have
just a small number of cases that we can deal with. Lawyers'
fees today in massive litigation or complex litigation are the tip
of the iceberg. Not only have the law schools trained lawyers,
so have business schools. Business schools have developed
significant bodies of consultants who enter the law firms, and
teach the law firms that there are massive profit centers, such
as xeroxing, which is a massive opportunity for income. Fax
machines are massive income opportunities. And discovery is
one of the most beautiful opportunities that you can ever find.
In fact, to a large extent discovery 'is people-driven within the
law firms. It is conceivable that someday we will develop a way
to do it through computers, as we begin to cut down on the
number of associates, paralegals and junior partners, who all
get involved in discovery and produce a profit for the firm. I
commend the court out in Cincinnati that tried the paperless
trial. It was all done through computers. They tried the case
and found out whether there was injury or non-injury, who
was right, who was wrong, and they didn't have a lot of paper
in the courtroom.
I'm not here to knock trial lawyers or their fees. I've paid
some whopping hourly rates to people willingly. On the other
hand the fee issue is going to be coming up I think in the next
few years because one way or another they have gone through
the roof in some instances. We talked about Rule 23 and how
in that situation there is opportunity for the court to review
the fees. And under local rules or ethical standards, we must
require a judge to look at what·the fees on both sides are. The
two judges that have written most compellingly on this are
Judge Weinstein, who has argued that in the mass litigation,
the standard 1/3 contingent fee no longer makes any sense,
and Judge Shadur of Northern District of illinois, who has
actually called on the plaintiffs' lawyer to bring his fees in, and
when he refused to do so, the judge said no fees. I submitted a
brief on that issue because we tried to cut down the costs so
that more money can go to claimants. Only five or ten cents of
every dollar spent goes to sick people, but then you see lawyers
HeinOnline -- 59 Brook. L. Rev. 1220 1993-1994
1220 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: 1199
that make $5,000,000, $10,000,000, and one last year made
$125,000,000 ($1,000,000 per day) in a case that lasted about 5
months. And he's now trying to buy the Baltimore Orioles to
reinvest some of that money.
Michael Jordan makes a lot of money playing basketball.
You can debate whether he's worth it or not. But I don't think
I could justify and I don't think anybody here can justify a
lawyer making $1,000,000 a day when his clients maybe will
get $20,000 each.
Dr. Hensler
I want to come back to Steve's comment a moment ago
about the students' reaction to the Agent Orange trial and
relate it to the discussion earlier this morning about teaching
civil procedure. Because it seems to me that it is that kind of
question that offers up an opportunity to pull together our
notions about class actions, our notions about factfinding and
the realities of these kinds of cases. I have also taught that
case, and it seems to me the issue it raises is how would you
get this type of case to trial. The risks of going to trial, a class
action trial, in that case on both sides were humongous. With
that kind of risk profile, the notion that the parties would
move forward if they can reach a settlement and the notion
that any judge would not take advantage of this is just
unrealistic. And so you have the alternative, the individual
trials-250,000 individual trials. The reality is that there isn't
any system in this country that can try those cases
individually so the challenge is determining what factfinding
means in that kind of context. It's not good enough to say well
we should have had a trial, because you're not going to get
that trial. And it's not good enough to say well, we should do it
individually, because we can't. I think we must start asking
how do we do factfinding in this kind of context?
Judge Winter
I'm not sure it would be better to have individual trials,
but I'll tell you one tIling, the number of plaintiffs in the case
was a result of certifjring the class, because then you could get
money just by joining in. If there were individual trials the
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strong ones would have been pursued perhaps. But there
would be a kind of rationing. What happens when you certify
the class with facts like Agent Orange-with more or less
unlimited number of people who may have been exposed-the
weak claims swamp the strong claims. You've got a big class.
The money on the table is enough to support the fees the
plaintiffs will want and then you come up with a settlement
that disperses money and weak claims get overcompensated
and strong claims get undercompensated.
Mr. Feinberg
With all due respect, it's not that easy. You look at
asbestos, where the weak claims have overwhelmed the strong
claims. Even in asbestos with asbestosis and known causal
connections, in the New York State courts an individual
pleural thickening case is worth $42,000. I don't think that
certification of a class compels settlement, I don't think
certification of a class is the difference between a flood of
claims and the absence of claims. When you look at the
optimistic title of this program, Reinventing Civil Litigation,
what I really heard the last hour and a half is that nothing
will cure the problem better than getting a better handle on
legal fees and getting judges with backbone. That's what I
really hear-that if judges are tougher throwing out bogus
claims, and they've got the tools to do it, and ifwe get a handle
and drive the system so that it's not as profitable then this
problem will likely at least be diminished and maybe
disappear. I don't think that's right, but maybe.
Professor Resnik
Actually I'd like to expand our options and not only think
of the problem as a tension between aggregation and
disaggregation. Rather than consider the inability to try
250,000 cases and consequently the need to settle, consider the
many positions in between: try some cases, then talk
settlement, try smaller subsets, try alternative forms of
dispute resolution for some and then others. This comment
returns to a point Deborah Hensler made earlier about the
timing of aggregation. When we aggregate immediately, as
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seems to be the current approach in the breast implant cases,
we then end up with potentially very powerful lawyers and
very powerful judges, relatively little public information, and
very few mechanisms of control over the principal actors. In
these aggregate cases, we've thrown a huge amount of power to
a very small number of lawyers who will gain great money and
judges who may gain great fame. How are we going to
constrain that power that we are thus creating?
Professor Elizabeth M. Schneider"
The range of options in the cases that we're talking about
can be very considerable. I do think that what we are talking
about is ''reinvention,'' because there is substantial discomfort
with dichotomized options, and need for exploration of what
Judge Weinstein called yesterday "the evolving substantive
nature of the law." We're not talking about separating the
"good" cases from the ''bad'' cases; the whole point is we don't
know that until way along in the litigation process. The
substantive law is evolving in such a way that what may have
been the "good" cases 10 years ago look worse now, where the
''bad'' ones 10 years ago look better now. It is important to
include a wider range of cases in our discussion.
The point that Judith Resnik made before about enlarging
our picture of large cases to include more than tort cases is
important. Fewer civil rights and Title VII cases are now in
the federal courts because it is difficult for individual litigants
to get counsel, to do discovery and to finance those cases. The
reason we're into a mass tort paradigm is because of the
particular context of the financing and the circumstances of
those cases. There's a whole other world of civil litigation that
has been largely shunted from the federal courts because of
deep problems that have not been addressed.
Professor Resnik
One of the poignancies I see is the extent to which the
focus on large scale cases brings us, not inappropriately, to
discovery reform, but less explored is its impact on the other
• Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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cases. Further, I wish we would not call large scale litigation
"complex" because that label then brings with it the
assumption that the rest of the docket is "simple" and
therefore less interesting. And then, Ralph Winter, willing to
volunteer as a trial judge, is assigned the cases other judges do
not want, which include claims of police brutality and
violations of other civil rights.
Judge Winter
I think you're right. I always viewed the proposal for this
automatic discovery as something that would help the small
cases. In ninety percent of the small cases, you would at that
first meeting exchange all of the discovery there had to be
except for one defendant or agent of defendant and the
plaintiff and maybe the plaintiffs doctor. And I always thought
that this would do that. And I don't see why you cannot work
out a system in which the average case in a federal district
court would be settled or tried within six months of its being
brought. I mean we really set our sights too low. This kind of
delay is intolerable, but I worry that the organized bar is not
going to let you change it.
Professor Jeffrey w: Stempel'
Something that concerns me is that there's this notion in
so much of our debate and certainly in other quarters that
these things are self-executing. Congress may not give us a
chance to test this. But I place a wager with Judge Winter that
mandatory disclosure isn't going to be any panacea without
judicial enforcement. Those same people who come to you and
haven't done their discovery won't have done their disclosure,
and you're going to have to give that same "give it to me in six
days or get ready to mandamus me" ultimatum in order to get
the kind of attorney behavior you want. Additionally, looking
at counsel fees, and this obviously relates to what we teach our
students, and how they practice and how the public perceives
lawyers, maybe we need to lobotomize lawyers away from their
adversarialism. But I think that without strong judicial
• Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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enforcement, a lot of these proposals are going to be doomed to
failure. More rules can make for more work, a danger we saw
with Robert Moses building the Long Island Expressway. You
build a road. It gets more traffic. And I'm just not sure that
we're not doing some de facto rationing of access to law by
being afraid to devote the resources to opening it up any
further in the light of what we've seen in the last twenty
years.
